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Abstract
We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a
supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This
setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on
the eﬀectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot
optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is un-
aﬀected by defensive shields if both countries have them, while a uni-
lateral endowment of such weapons has destabilising consequences.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009) discuss the role of
defensive shields in nuclear conflicts, an issue that has remained a hot one
throughout the Cold War and has become even more so in coincidence with
the Strategic Defense Initiative (commonly known as ‘Star Wars’) during
the Reagan administration and afterwards. This particular topic nests into a
more general debate concerning escalation and deterrence, precisely because
defensive shields may ultimately jeopardise the deterrence capability of nu-
clear arsenals.1 Consequently, a specific discussion has been carried out on
this aspect, with a striking lack of consensus. Some, like Wilkening (2000)
and Lebovic (2002) have focussed on the eﬃciency of ballistic missile defence,
while others have reached opposite conclusions as to the interplay between
defensive shields and deterrence: on one side, there are scholars convinced of
the destabilising eﬀects of shields (e.g., Brams and Kilgour, 1988; and Miller,
2001); on the other, there are those sustaining the opposite view (e.g., Powell,
1990, 2003; and Lindsay and O’Hanlon, 2001).
Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009) use a repeated game framework to
show that “the unilateral acquisition of defensive weapons raises the stronger
country’s predatory incentives and reduces the sustainability of peace” (p.
282). To do so, they model the supergame following the route traced by
Friedman (1971), whereby trigger strategies imply that a unilateral strike is
followed by an everlasting Nash punishment consisting in permanent conflict.
This particular component of the supergame - the design of the punishment
phase - is indeed critical, as perpetual conflict may not be sustainable if
countries have conspicuous endowments of nuclear weapons, whose massive
1The number of contributions being published in recent years demonstrate that these
aspects remain at the core of international politics even after the end of the Cold War (see
Powell, 1990; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000; Danilovic, 2002; Freedman, 2004; Zagare, 2004,
to mention only a few).
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use in the very first phase of the confrontation would very rapidly annihilate
contenders altogether, leaving possibly open the way for a retaliation strike
but almost surely not for an infinite repetition of the constituent game.2
Therefore, we propose here an alternative approach to the construction of
the supergame, based on one-shot optimal punishment (Abreu, 1986). This
type of punishment, besides being the most eﬃcient one, has the additional
advantage - which is particularly convenient when it comes to assessing the
eﬀectiveness of deterrence in preventing the emergence of nuclear conflicts
- of allowing us to do altogether away with the Nash equilibrium of the
constituent game in building up the equilibrium conditions based on the
players’ intertemporal payoﬀs.
As in Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009), we examine a two-country
game, whose constituent stage is a prisoners’ dilemma. The main results
yielded by our setup can be summarised as follows. In the symmetric case
where both countries have defensive shields, (i) the stability condition for the
sustainability of perpetual peace is completely independent of the shields,
while (ii) the one-shot optimal punishment is inversely related to the shield’s
eﬀectiveness. If instead only one country is endowed with defensive weapons,
then indeed the shield has a destabilising eﬀect on the supergame. While the
latter result is independent of the punishment scheme, the former is indeed
sensitive to it.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The basic model is
illustrated in section 2. Section 3 investigates the supergame. Concluding
2In this respect, it is worth recalling that, during the Cuba crisis, President Kennedy
ordered (among other things) to keep aloft the Strategic Air Command bombers armed
with nuclear weapons for a gross total of 7000 megatons around the clock. It is hardly
credible that an infinitely repeated game could follow the very first stage. Also note that,
for several years, General Curtis LeMay was convinced that his strategic bombers could
‘bring the enemy back to the stone age in the first six hours’, this all-out attack being
known as the ‘Sunday punch’ (for more details on this, see Rhodes, 1995).
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remarks are in section 4.
2 The setup
The model can be quickly laid out as follows. Players are two countries,
labelled as 1 and 2, interacting over time t = 0, 1, 2, 3...∞. Country i’s per-
period payoﬀ is
ui = π (1− aj (1− σ) + zai (1− σ))− ba2i − C (σ) , (1)
i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i. In (1),
• π > 0 is the instantaneous welfare associated with perpetual peace,
gross of any costs associated with building up oﬀensive weapons ai and
the defensive shield σ. Given that we are dealing with the analysis of a
possible nuclear confrontation, net payoﬀs are not necessarily positive
(indeed they may become strongly negative). Even in a peaceful sit-
uation, the investment in a defensive shield may be so costly to cause
π < C (σ) .
• The term 1−aj (1− σ)+zai (1− σ) multiplying π determines how much
the aforementioned utility is modified by a war where the intensity of
attacks are ai and aj, respectively, and both countries are endowed
with a shield σ. Note that to be fully eﬀective the shield should have
size one. Accordingly, to capture the idea that, reasonably, building up
the ‘perfect shield’ is indeed an unrealistic objective, we may assume
the cost function C (σ) associated with the R&D activities and the
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implementation of the defensive shield obeys the following:3
C (σ) = 0;
∂C (σ)
∂σ
> 0;
∂2C (σ)
∂σ2
> 0; lim
σ→1
C (σ) =∞. (2)
Parameter z > 0 measures how sensitive country i is to a strike of
intensity ai brought to bear against country j, as opposed to the dam-
ages inflicted by the opponent through an attack of size aj. For any
z ∈ (0, 1) , country i exhibits what we may define as a net damage
aversion, in that any advantage generated by its own strike against j
is oﬀset, all else equal, by the damage caused by a comparable amount
of, say, nuclear bombing borne by i itself. If instead z > 1, country i is
keen on attacking the adversary no matter what (this may reflect the
fact that hawks are in control of i’s actions).
• ba2i is the production cost associated with building up the amount of
nuclear weapons ai, at decreasing returns to scale.
Before delving into the structure and properties of the repeated game, we
briefly illustrate the basic features of the constituent one-shot game.
2.1 The one-shot game
The equilibrium of the one-shot constituent game can be quickly charac-
terised. The first order condition of country i is:
∂ui
∂ai
= z (1− σ)π − 2bai = 0 (3)
yielding a∗i = z (1− σ) π/ (2b) . For future reference, it is worth noting that
(3) implies that the two countries’ best reply functions are orthogonal to
3For instance, a cost function with these properties is
C (σ) =
1
1− σ − 1.
This would indeed imply π − C (σ) < 0 for values of σ suﬃciently close to one.
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each other, so that the resulting equilibrium is the intersection of dominant
strategies. The associated utility is
u∗ =
4b [π − C (σ)]− z (2− z) (1− σ)2 π2
4b
> 0 (4)
for all
b > max
(
0,
z (2− z) (1− σ)2 π2
4 [π − C (σ)]
)
. (5)
To this regard, note that, for all z ∈ (0, 2) any b > 0 suﬃces to ensure that
u∗i > 0.
There remains to verify that z ∈ (0, 2) suﬃces to imply that the underly-
ing structure corresponds to a prisoners’ dilemma. To see this, observe that
the decision whether to attack or not can be evaluated by looking at the
following 2× 2 reduced form matrix:
2
P A
1 P uPP ; uPP uPA ; uAP
A uAP ; uPA u∗ ; u∗
Matrix 1: The one-shot game in reduced form
Pure strategies P and A stand for remaining peaceful and attacking,
respectively. The outcome (A,A) portrays the equilibrium of the game in
continuous strategies described above.
The payoﬀ accruing to each player when both choose P is generated by
ai = aj = 0, so that it corresponds to
uPP = π − C (σ) (6)
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with
uPP − u∗ = z (2− z) (1− σ)
2 π2
4b
> 0 (7)
for all z ∈ (0, 2) .
Then, consider the unilateral deviation from the peaceful outcome via the
dominant strategy a∗i = z (1− σ)π/ (2b) , yielding to the deviator a payoﬀ
equal to
uAP = π − C (σ) + z
2 (1− σ)2 π2
4b
> 0 (8)
while the country enduring the strike gets
uPA = π − C (σ)− z (1− σ)
2 π2
2b
(9)
with
uAP − uPP = u∗ − uPA = z
2 (1− σ)2 π2
4b
> 0 always. (10)
Hence,
Lemma 1 The one-shot game reflects the structure of a prisoners’ dilemma
for all z ∈ (0, 2) .
As is well known, repeating the prisoners’ dilemma over an infinite hori-
zon may allow players to attain Pareto-superior outcomes (as compared to
the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot constituent game), provided they are
enough forward looking, i.e., their intertemporal preferences must satisfy a
condition whose specific nature will depend upon the rules of the supergame
itself (in particular, the duration and intensity of the punishment phase).
These aspects are investigated in the next section.
3 The supergame
The backbone of the literature on supergames is the so called Folk Theorem,
that has evolved over the decades taking several alternative forms. From a
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qualitative point of view, the diﬀerent formulations of this theorem yield the
invariant message that infinite repetition allows players to reach any equilib-
rium outcomes Pareto-dominating that of the one-shot game, provided the
players themselves be patient enough. The research eﬀorts carried out over
the last four decades have pointed at refining the structure of the punishment
phase in order to yield the most eﬃcient outcome, all else equal. For this rea-
son, we will focus here on a supergame based upon Abreu’s one-shot optimal
punishments (Abreu, 1986). Then, the performance of optimal punishments
will also be contrasted with that of the version of this supergame based on
an infinite Nash reversion, as in Friedman (1971), although the latter has to
be taken with a pinch of salt for the aforementioned reasons.
Countries, being symmetric in all respects, are assumed to have the same
time preferences, represented by the time-invariant discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] .
The rules of the supergame unravelling under the deterrence exerted by one-
shot optimal punishments can be spelled out as follows.
• At t = 0, both countries play strategy P (i.e., ai = 0).
• At any t ≥ 1, both countries keep playing P provided both have played
P at t − 1; otherwise, if any deviation from (0, 0) has been observed
at t − 1, then at t countries are to implement the symmetric optimal
punishment aop.
• Subsequently, at t+ 1 players return to strategy P provided that both
of them have implemented the optimal punishment at t. If not (i.e., if
at least one of them has deviated from the punishment), they are again
required to play aop.
This last rules entails that abiding by the symmetric optimal punishment
simultaneously confines the punishment phase to a single period, while any
deviation from it extends the punishment phase itself.
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The individual payoﬀ generated by the adoption of symmetric optimal
punishments is:
uop = π − C (σ)− aop [baop + (1− z) (1− σ)π] (11)
while the optimal unilateral deviation from the optimal penal code is given
by the dominant strategy a∗i = z (1− σ)π/ (2b), yielding the payoﬀ
uDop = π − C (σ)− aop (1− σ) π + z
2 (1− σ)2 π2
4b
> uop always. (12)
Perpetual peace is sustainable forever on the basis of the deterrence ex-
erted by optimal punishments if and only if the following conditions are met:
uAP − uPP ≥ δ
¡
uPP − uop
¢
(13)
uDop − uop ≥ δ
¡
uPP − uop
¢
(14)
Inequality (13) has to be met in order for unilateral deviations from the
perpetual peace path not to be advantageous, while (14) establishes that
deviations from the symmetric optimal punishment are not attractive.
This yields a system of two inequalities in two unknowns, the discount
factor δ and the optimal punishment aop. Solving, we obtain that (13-14) are
simultaneously satisfied by any pair
aop ≥ z (1− σ)π
b
; δ ≥ z
4
(15)
This proves the following result:
Lemma 2 Under the threat of optimal punishments aop ≥ z (1− σ)π/b, the
two countries can sustain perpetual peace provided their common time pref-
erences satisfy δ ≥ z/4.
A direct consequence of the above lemma is
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Proposition 3 The intensity of the optimal punishment is monotonically
decreasing in the eﬀectiveness of the shield σ. Instead, the stability of per-
petual peace in altogether independent of σ.
As an ancillary observation, it is worth noting that
z
4
∈
∙
0,
1
2
¸
∀z ∈ [0, 2] . (16)
More interesting is the fact that, the critical level of the discount factor
being independent of the presence and size of shields that in turn aﬀects the
harshness of the punishment, the foregoing analysis also entails:
Corollary 4 In the absence of shields (i.e., if σ = 0), perpetual peace is
again sustainable for all δ ≥ z/4. However, the punishment has to reach its
peak at aop ≥ zπ/b.
That is, the stability condition is exactly the same but it needs to be
accompanied by a threat whose intensity is magnified as much as possible by
the absence of any defensive screens whatsoever.
To appreciate the role of optimal punishments in determining the con-
dition for peace stability, we may briefly dwell upon the stability condition
generated by the alternative punishment consisting in an infinite reversion
to the Nash equilibrium of the constituent game - as it has been used in the
supergame analysed by Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009). Like them, we
will look at the admittedly quite unrealistic perspective in which perpetual
war after a unilateral first strike is admissible. Following Friedman (1971),
the perpetual stability of peace requires
uPP
1− δ ≥ u
AP +
αu∗
1− δ (17)
⇔ z (1− σ)
2 π2 (2δ − z)
4 (1− δ) b ≥ 0
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which is met by all δ ≥ z/2. As expected, this of course is higher than
(indeed, twice as high as) the critical discount factor generated by optimal
punishments.4 It is worth stressing that, as is the case under optimal pun-
ishments, also the infinite Nash reversion yields a stability condition that is
completely independent of defensive paraphernalia.
To this regard, it can be shown that completely diﬀerent considerations
hold true in the more realistic case in which war cannot continue ad infinitum.
To see this, assume first that one period of symmetric conflict suﬃces to erase
the two countries.5 Peace stability requires:
uPP
1− δ ≥ u
AP + δu∗. (18)
In general, if war may be sustained for, say, T − 1 periods after the first
strike, the above inequality rewrites as
uPP
1− δ ≥ u
AP + u∗
TX
t=1
δt (19)
with
TX
t=1
δt =
1− δT+1
1− δ − 1 =
δ − δT+1
1− δ . (20)
The presence of shields may extend the terminal date T ensuring the survival
of both countries over a longer horizon, whereby we may take T as a function
of shields σ and suppose that ∂T (σ, σ) /∂σ > 0. If so, then
∂
Ã
δ − δT (σ,σ)+1
1− δ
!
∂σ
= −δ
T (σ,σ)+1 ln (δ) ∂T (σ, σ) /∂σ
1− δ > 0 (21)
4One could perform the same exercise using Axelrod’s (1981) tit-for-tat strategies, with
qualitatively analogous results.
5This is a realistic scenario, if one duly takes into account the global consequences of
even a limited use of nuclear weapons. See, e.g., Mills et al. (2008).
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because ln (δ) < 0 as δ, in general, will be lower than one. Hence, we may
expect shields to exert a destabilising eﬀect precisely because they are likely
to keep the supergame going after a first strike. This entails that assessing
peace sustainability in a supergame relying on Nash punishments is a tricky
task, as the answer ultimately depends on whether or not the punishment
phase is indeed infinitely long.
The next question is whether an asymmetric situation in which one coun-
try is endowed with defensive weapons while the other is not may give rise
to instability. This perspective is dealt with in the following section.
3.1 The asymmetric supergame
Now suppose country i has a shield of size σ while j hasn’t any. The corre-
sponding per period utilities are
ui = π (1− aj (1− σ) + zai)− ba2i − C (σ) ;
uj = π (1− ai + zaj (1− σ))− ba2j .
(22)
On the basis of (22), we can identify the relevant payoﬀs for the construction
of the incentive compatibility constraints that have to be satisfied here in
order for perpetual peace to be stable all over the supergame.
If ai = aj = 0, we have uPPi = π − C (σ) and uPPj = π, while unilateral
deviations from the peaceful path yield, respectively:
uAPi = π − C (σ) +
z2π2
4b
; uAPj = π +
z2 (1− σ)2 π2
4b
. (23)
The punishment profits are
uopi = π
¡
1− aopj (1− σ) + za
op
i
¢
− b (aopi )
2 − C (σ) ;
uopj = π
¡
1− aopi + za
op
j (1− σ)
¢
− b
¡
aopj
¢2
.
(24)
where we may expect to observe aopi 6= aopj given the asymmetry of the present
setup. Likewise, deviations from the optimal penal code yield asymmetric
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payoﬀs:
uDopi = π − C (σ) + π
µ
z2π
4b
− aopj (1− σ)
¶
;
uopj =
π
¡
z2 (1− σ)2 π + 4 (1− aopi ) b
¢
4b
.
(25)
The set of constraints to be satisfied for the sustainability of perpetual
peace is
uAPi − uPPi ≥ δι
¡
uPPi − uopi
¢
uDopi − u
op
i ≥ δi
¡
uPPi − uopi
¢ (26)
with i = 1, 2. Note that the discount factor is indexed as well since under
asymmetric conditions the relative stability thresholds are necessarily asym-
metric. Solving these four inequalities, we obtain
δi ≥ δ (σ, 0) ≡
z
4 (1− σ)2
; δj ≥ δ (0, σ) ≡
z (1− σ)2
4
; (27)
aopi ≥
zπ
b
; aopj ≥
z (1− σ)π
b
. (28)
Now note that
∂δ (σ, 0)
∂σ
=
z
2 (1− σ)3
> 0∀σ ∈ [0, 1) , (29)
whereby we can state:
Proposition 5 Monopoly power on defensive weapons has clearcut destabil-
ising eﬀects on the supergame, as the country being unilaterally endowed with
the shield will be more tempted to strike than otherwise.
It is true that ∂δ (0, σ) /∂σ < 0, so that the other country acts indeed as
a puppy dog,6 but unfortunately country i faces a more demanding threshold
and this may have awful consequences on the stability of peace, as already
highlighted by Chassang and Padro´ I Miquel (2009).
6This label, identifying a player as a comparatively innocuous domestic pet, dates back
to Fudenberg and Tirole (1984).
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As an ancillary observation, note that δ (σ, 0) = δ (0, σ) = z/4 if σ = 0
while, for any positive value of σ, we have δ (σ, 0) > z/4 > δ (0, σ) . To sum
up our analysis, we may now formulate the following:
Theorem 6 For all δ ∈ [δ (σ, 0) , 1] , perpetual peace is sustainable irrespec-
tive of the relative defensive endowments; for all δ ∈ [z/4, δ (σ, 0)) , perpetual
peace is sustainable only if countries have symmetric defensive endowments;
for all δ ∈ [0, z/4) , perpetual peace is unsustainable.
Now, to complete the picture, we may turn again to the stability re-
quirement generated by the reversion to the one-shot Nash equilibrium a` la
Friedman (1971) after the first strike has taken place. It suﬃces to look at
the condition faced by the country that has endowed itself with a defensive
shield, since if this is violated then necessarily a war will break out. The
relevant inequality is defined as in (19), with
T (σ,0)X
t=1
δt =
1− δT (σ,0)+1
1− δ − 1 =
δ − δT (σ,0)+1
1− δ . (30)
and
∂
Ã
δ − δT (σ,0)+1
1− δ
!
∂σ
= −δ
T (σ,0)+1 ln (δ) ∂T (σ, 0) /∂σ
1− δ > 0, (31)
which is qualitatively (although not quantitatively) the same as in the fully
symmetric setting.
4 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the issue of the interplay between deterrence and defensive
weapons in a repeated game with optimal one-shot punishments, to show
that the sustainability of peace is unaﬀected by defensive shields if each
country has one, while the monopoly of such weapons has indeed destabilising
consequences.
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